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The S�n Self: 
Ambivalent or Paradoxical? 
George J .  Srack 
Although I em in eubetanttal agree.ent vtth .any of the 
q,�stto08 that are raised tn Judith Tor11ey'a interpretation of 
a central feature of S a rtre's conception of the aelf, there are 
a nuaber of potnte ehe .akea vtth which l vould have to dta­
agree. In general, the charact erizat ion of the self tn Sartre 's 
t'bought aa ·contradictory• ia alao disputable even though i t  
•uet � aaid, tn a l l  f airneee, that Sartre himself aoeettmes 
auggeata auch a notion. 
It te ironic, tn a vay, that Freud ' s  conception of the 
aplittt,_ of the aelf ta described •• a for• of paychologtcal 
Hanicheantam. Por, tf anyone haa Manichean tendencies of 
thought, it te Sartre. But hie tendency to think in te"6 of 
radical dualities te prtiurtly found in hie di stinction bet·veen 
repulsive '"be1nge-in-the•selvea'" (or vhat others call Mtertal 
beings or thtnga ) a nd  the traoaceDdent purity of the -for 
itself- or consctoueneaa .  Relying basically on Sartre'• 
reference to the role of contradictory concepts in bad f atth, 
Ke. Totwey aaeu�e t hat thta 111eana that the s e l f  deecrtbed by 
Sartre is ·contradictory· and relates this assumption to the 
psychological conception of ••bi valence. It te precisely this 
concatenation of ideas that ia queattonable. 
A9'bivalence , as l understand i t ,  ie a psychological atate 
tn vhtch an individual experiences uncertainty because he or 
a.he ie unable to .ake a choice or because he or ehe hae a 
eimultaneoua desire or proclivity to say o r  do oppoei;e thing s .  
Thie general definition o f  ambivalence hae a .ore apectftc 
application to psychoanalytic thought :  it ta the coexistence of 
positive and negative feeltnga tOt1arda the aa.e person, object, 
or action. In te?Wi of either a general or apec·iftc notion of 
a•btvalence, it ta difficult to eee why it ahould be construed 
a e  analogous to logical contradiction. A love-hate relatton­
ahtp certainly h.. contradictory teoaiooa and conf ltcttng 
desires or a t titudes that are dtequtettng; but neither are 
contradictotY in a strictly logical e e ne e .  Raving positive and 
negative feelings tovarde someone or aomethtng ta an under­
atandable psychological atate, and it does not violate the lav 
of contradiction. It ta for this reason that I believe that 
•uch of vhat ta aatd about Sartre'• oatenatble notion of an 
ambivalent aelf ta questionable. 
The ambivalent self that Tormey deacribea aa a kind of 
living logical contradiction, one that ta deter•:ined to act by 
nothing, aee.s to be J110re her creation than Sartre ' • •  And the 
auggeatton that Sartre holds that the aalf ta radically free 
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because i t  18 'a•bivaler.t ' i s ,  at leas t ,  •1slead1ng. For 
Sartre, the self that hss �en (one ' s  pas � )  is not free; 1 t i s  
a •tacticity·. The s e l f  that e�i•t• for others i s  ar. objecti­
f i e d  s e l f ,  a being for others that is petrified not only by 
•the look, • but by evaluation and judg�nt as we l l .  In ter•s of 
the invardneas of comciouaness, the ' s e l f '  is dyna•i. c ,  in 
proce s s ,  ·surging· (in Sartre ' s  metapt�rical laoguage) towards 
vhat it is not y e t ,  but .. y becot1e. We are free, for Sa�tre, 
for the ai•ply s t a t ed ,  but met aphysically coeplex, reason that, 
as comciousnees, ve are not beings in the vorld: ve are an 
dDdeter•ined no-thing. We are radically free because, in 
Sartre ' a  viev, our preaent con11cioueness is not deter•ined by 
anything, not even our ovn past. S o ,  if •Y interpretation of 
Sartre i• viable, the point of the ••bivalence of the self is 
irrelevant to hie defence of freedo•. letveen our past aeries 
of choices, decisions , aod actions eod a present choice, there 
ia vhat Sartre ca l l s  a caesura, a break, a pause or, in CllOre 
dra.atic lan�uage, "nothingn es s · .  Civen h i s  rather daring 
theory of the 'structure' of conaciousn e a e ,  Sartre haa the 
basic ingredient for hi• defence of rad i c a l  freedo�. A•bi­
valence aey i•pede or inhibit choice and action, but once an 
act ta undertaken ( i n  Sartre'a account of the ma t t e r ) ,  then ve 
are aubject to the universal causal nexua of phyaical eventa. 
What I have elaevhere called the idea of abstract freedo� 
rooted in the ontological structure of conaciousne•• is central 
to Sartre'a concepton of the origin of freedo•• Even the moat 
••bivalent of persons cannot � concretely in an '••bivalent' 
vay. And an action, despite the Marxian belief in ontological 
'contradiction• ' i n  nature or society, cannot be literally 
comtrued aa contradictory. 
In regard to the issue of deception of others, I agree 
wholeheartedly vith what Judith To�y ha• said on the 1D8tter. 
the deceiver of others •use, obviously, know what he i s  not 
telling others . The corporation executive who tell• a group of 
workers that if they increase productivity, then they will 
probably forest a l l  future staff reductions is deceiving them if 
he knova that there will be inevitable reduction• in the work­
force with or without increased production. The cunning 
deceiver, of course, uaually only i•pliea or augg�•t• something 
which he knova will not take place. Deception � lying; but i t  
i a  alao ao•etimea •isleading others, offering veiled proeiaes, 
.. ntpulating t� feeling• of others, and •uch .aore. 
Self-deception, aa Tonney correctly shows, i• eomevhat more 
complicated. \lhile it does aee� t o  entail a kind of duality, 
it is not necessarily a duality in t h e  s e l f .  It is one and the 
aame per11on who tries to diaguiae or hide hie or her true 
aotivea, be l i e f  a, or feeling• froa hi .. e l f  or herself. Freud 
i s  quite cOBpetitive with Sartre on chi• score. Eapecially i n  
h i s  analy•i• of the •defence mechania .. • that people co11.110nly 
uae, he 1 •  insightful. ln rationali&ation, for exaaple, we 
present for public comu•ption an acceptable reason for our 
behavior which diaguiaea a rationale that 11ay not be too 
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f lattertng. A pe rs o n  makes a generous contribution t o  a 
popular charity out of pure generosi:y (he says to others and 
to hmiel f ) ,  b u t ,  tn his subjective consciousne s s ,  he knows that 
he made the cont ribution purely for self-interested reasons ( t o  
d i s play public service for some anticipated gain, t o  obtain a 
substantial reduction of taxes, e t c . ) .  Of cours e ,  since these 
mo t ives for behaving tn a certain way aeY not be acceptable to 
the !'!!.�� or self-tcnage of such a person, he endeavors to 
obscure them f roe his own view by •pushing the� into the 
uncon&ctous .t nd . ·  Less esoterically put, one could say that 
the self-deceiver engages tn ·select ive forge t t ing . ..  The 
subjective transforeatton of a motive or rationale aa y ,  as 
Freud a f f i rms and Sartre denies, involve something very much 
like ·unconscious .. patterns of thinking. Certainly, as Tormey 
points out, t h i s  process would probably be more coepltcated in 
cases of genuine ambivalence. But, again, 1 see no reason to 
assume a ' s p l i t '  or dtvtston tn the self to account for t h i s .  
Uhen we act out o f  a s t a t e  o f  ambivalence, we ma y  honestly say 
that ve do n o t  actually know why w e  performed a certain act . 
That t s ,  tn the case men� tned above, t f  a person desi res to be 
generous � to seek personal gain through generos i t y ,  the 
action may , i nd e e d ,  proceed out of confltcttng moLtves. This 
t est i f i e s  to the coeplextty of s e l f ,  but not to its logomo rphtc 
' s tructure ' .  
I t.  t s  not, as t s  s a i d, the condt tton of ambivalence that 
creates an .. e•pttness- tn the s e l f ,  for Sartre. In a s t r ic t  
s e ns e ,  consciousness t s  not the " s e l f .  tn Sartre 's view. 
Consciousness ts the prt1110rdtal ort�tn of freedom, posstbltcy, 
and hence, choice, decision, and a c t i o n. The s e l f  ts what we 
become through a c t i o n .  As Sartre says in his popular essay, 
•Existentialism as Hucnantsm,· a "man t s  the suUI of his ac­
t i o ns . ·  T h e  real i z a t i o n  of one projecc entails the ne�a�ton of 
c ,om pe t tng projects. Anbtvalence tn regard t.o compe ting choices 
ts only resolved through decisive choice and subsequent action. 
Uhtle deliberation ts an a c t  of consciousness, it does not 
entail concrete action. If we were able co remain in a state 
of ambivalent 1m1110bt l t t y  or indecisivenes s ,  then we could not 
strive to realize a ·project• a n d ,  hence, i n  Sartre ' s  view, we 
would neither act nor exist tn the strong sense of that word . 
The teneton tn human existence that Sartre refers to tn regard 
to •bad f a i t h •  has to do primarily with a tendency to deny our 
freedom by trying to become an object, a ·being tn itse l f . ·  
The watter, t n  Sartre's exa1'.ple t n  Being and Nolhin!!!ess , who 
thinks of htaself wholly and entirely as a ·wa i t e r , ·  as a kind 
of ·watter--tn-ttsel f,  • ts not anbtvalent towards his behavior 
and he ts not tn a s t a t e  of ambivalence. He ts cons c i o u s l y  
w ill ing to present himself a s ,  and think of h i ms e l f  a s ,  a 
waiter by denying h i s  • transcendence , ·  his freedom. Self­
deceptton ts taraanent tn such a s i t uation because this project 
cannot be completed • • •  because the person (or consciousnes s )  
who endeavors t o  be a watter only t s  aware t h a t ,  as a free 
conactousnes s ,  he ts above or outside what. he t s  trying t o  be .  
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Tor.ey ie ri�h� �her. she eaye tha� s e l f -decep� ion requires what 
Sartre calls the ·art of for•ing con�radictory conce p � s . ·  The 
pel"aoo playing t �  social role of · v a 1 t e r · 1 n ·bad fai�h"" knows 
that be 11 tryt � c.o exhaue� h 1 1  entire be1ng tn the role of 
·wa1-.er· and he ta q1.d:.e evare that he ta no�, in a strict 
aeme, eole-1 y a "aiter. By trying to become the •f acticity• of 
being a wat�er. the person thinks, "" l  am a w a t t e r . ·  However, 
aa I unde ratand S a r t re' a poaitton here, the same �non also 
knove, aa a free con&ciouaneaa, that ·r am not a waite r . ·  This 
ta the paradox of ·bad faith•: aa long aa man haa the nature of 
both a bound f actictty and a totally free coll8c1oueneae, he 
cannot achieve authentic self-deception tn.sof ar .. he ta 
conactoualy aware of acctng in ·bad f a i t h . -
The analysts o f  be d  f a t t h  in Being and Nothingness and the 
coeval analyete of &elf-deception ta one of the llO S �  su btle 
arguments in a work replete vi�h eoph1st1ca ted philoaophtcal 
arguments. Briefly stated, Sartre argues that no one can claim 
to be ,  vbolly and entirely, what he ta and no one can claim to 
be entirely vhat he ia not. I cannot , to ta�e Sartre ' s  ex­
ample, think of myself ae a total coward, as an absolute 
coward, because I cannot determine myself aa a finished, 
complete entity, aa a being in i t s e l f .  For, fll'f consctouenea1 
of intentionally determining f!lY&elf ae a "'coward· is a free act 
of a free conscioueneee that eludes my cognitive determination 
of myself aa a ·coward.· No one can be a total coward any ri.ore 
than anyone can be an ·honest person.· Vith sufficient know­
ledge of someone afi'e r hie or her death we 11ay say, •tte was a 
coward . ·  Thie ie poaatble because the person referred to 1e now 
a co.plete facticity. In the hell in which three characters 
live in No E x i t ,  the characters suffer from the full il lumina­
tion, without excuse, of their being, their f acticity shaped 
through their actions in life. For one who has lived in •bad 
faith• or who has trfed to do ao, thia t a ,  indeed, h e l l .  Ae 
long ae ti(e are actively involved in the proceee of l i f e ,  
however ,  we a r e  paradoxical beioga compriaed, eaaentially, of 
trall8cendence (freedom) and f acticity (determination).  It ie 
t h i s  dual i t y ,  and not etatee of ambivalence, that make the 
project of bed faith poa eible, but unattainable. 
If it were genuinely poaaible, which it ie not, literally 
to be ( l e t  ue say) courageoue, then the project& of bed faith 
and self-deception could be carried out. If one were com­
pletely courageous, then one would have become a complete 
being, a finished human product, an object like others. Living 
in bad f a i t h ,  as Sartre describes 1 t ,  positively requires that 
my project to be courageous be impossible. A non-conecioua 
object cannot be i n  •bad faith• because it ta what i t  t a .  I t  
h .. no alterity i n  i t se l f ;  i t  cannot be what i t  t e  n o t .  The 
purity and perfection of works of art,  eepec .ially eci.tlpturee, 
ie espoused by Sartre precisely because of hie consistent 
ontology. A fine piece of sculpture ie complete in i t s e l f ,  
perfect of i t e  t i nd ,  a pleasing, beautiful , aesthetically 
perceived facticity. If ve ask why Sartre· 11a1ntains that no 
one can be totally atncere o r  completely immersed in bad faith, 
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we �usl turn, ae ToI'llley almost does, t o  his ontology of hun111n 
being. A t  this point, o f  course, temporary states of ambiva­
lence, as w e l l  as the ·ambivalent s e l f , - are l e f t  behind. 
In concluding portions of the paper under consideration, 
it ie said thal human existence must � described in tel"1U of 
contrad i c t i o n  presumably because t he  s e l f  hae a contradictory 
nature. Ad�i t t e d l y ,  thie is an interpretation that Sartre him­
s e l f  somet.imes seeas to i n v i t e .  Howeve r ,  it i e  misleading. 
\lithout getting into the int.ricacies of Sartr e ' s  unusual onto­
logy and sotne of i t s  i n ternal conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  we can 
safely say that S a r t r e ' s  phenomenology moves from a description 
of conscious nes s ,  i t e  being and its a c L e ,  to a description of 
being-for-others and f i n a l ly to concrete action in a world com­
prised of ·instrumental c<llllplexes , �  cultural o b j e c t s ,  and the 
ever-presen t ,  elight. ly menacing. "others . ·  In a eense , we hAve 
to read Being and Nothingness f orwarde,  but understand it back­
�ards. For, what Sartre presents s e r i atim, out of phenomenolo­
gical neces s i t y ,  is r e a l l y  exp�rienced a l l  a t  once in t h e  dy­
namics of a c t u a l t i t y .  The concrete freedom and concrete action 
mentioned a t  the conclusion of his work entails an interaction 
of consciousneee and f a ct i c i t y ,  an interaction that. is explored 
in C r i t ique de !.!.. raison d i a l e c L ique .  Aside from the a r t i f i ­
c i a l  descriptions o f  a phenomenology o f  human r e a l i t y ,  exis­
tence takes place i n  a causal network comprising -the world­
and, in that world, consciouenees is iromanent in ma n t a  f a c t i ­
c i t  y .  The l i v i ng s e l f  is neither coneciouenees nor f a c t i c i ,t y :  
i l  i s  created, for be t t e r  o r  worse, through the action of what 
may be c a l l e d  a ·consci ousness-body . - As ironical as i t  
sounds, given S a r t r e ' s  preoccupation w i t h  the internal pro­
ceeees of consciousn e s s ,  the e e l f  i s  a public e n t i t y ,  something 
that exists for others. It is for this reason that he says that 
Marcel Proust i s  the author o f  Remembrance of TI\ings Paet and 
other works, the person known by others who lived h i s  life in a 
certain way. Proust is not what, in imagination, he may have 
thought he was;  his dreams, h i s  fantasies , hie unfulfilled 
p l a ns, hie hope s ,  all of these are evanescent a n d  irrelevant to 
what, f i n a l l y ,  he was. This view o f  the self i s  what accounts 
for S a r t r e ' s  tendency to present individuals in what seems to 
be a hareh, uneecapable, total i l lumina t i o n .  P u t  simply, ve are 
what we become in our l i f e t i me  through the reali�ation of our 
proj e c t s ,  no matter how humble or grandiose they IDSY b e .  
The incomplete s e l f ,  the e e l f  i n  process o f  fonnation, the 
s e l f  we are ineluctably becoming through our proj e c t s ,  our 
choices, and our actions , t h i s  s e l f  is paradox i c a l ,  but not 
ambivale n t .  The fonnula cited a t  the end o f  "The Ambivalent 
S e l f� should have been c i t e d  at i t s  beginning. For, i t  is the 
key to S a r t r e ' s  understanding of the becoming of the s e l f .  
A l t  hough some philoaphers i n  the Anglo-American, lingu i s t i c  
analysis camp have found t h i e  conception of human reality 
�untidy , - Sartre knows exactly what he is saying. Prom 
Kie rkegaard, in the f i r s t  i ns t ance , and from Heidegger, Sartre 
6
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 14 [1983], No. 1, Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol14/iss1/10
1 2 6  GEORGE J .  STACK 
has adop�ed the f ur.daaien�al on�ology of aan that conceives of 
h i m  as a dyr.a�ic s y n � h e s i s  of �hat Kierkegaard called -neces­
a t t y - and ·pos s i b i l i t y - end Heidegger celled Faktizitat and 
Hogl i chke i t .  l n  t e nias  o f  what an individual h as  done up t o  the 
preaenc and in tenis of vhac. he or ahe has endured up to the 
·present , the individlual 's being 18 characterh.ed by f a c t ic: i t y .  
Only vhac hae already occurred i s  'neceaaar)'·' o r  ltae � e n  
e 111pirtcally de t e na1ned. 1f un were o n l y  ¥hat h e  has been or 
ia now, he vould be aaal ogous to a mere beiog (Seie�) or an 
e t re-en-•oi. However, ae �ierkegaard f.t rs t  aaid and later 
William James asserted in the name of a •naniah thinker , ·  .. n 
· u vea forward . "  What a person hae done or haa Wldergone 
,cannot be effaced or negated. But a peraon'a potentiali tiea or 
existential poaaibilit iea have -not yet" been realized. I f  
they • Y  or u y  not be realized i n  futuro, then they are 
contingent po•aibi l i t i e s .  Si nce thinkers aa diverae as 
Aristotle and Hampahire have tneiated that aan has unique 
·potent t a l i t i ee ,  then, in thia aenee, potentiality ta pert of 
the bei n,r of u n .  
traoelatiog the above into Sartre'a paradoxical i d i om ,  ve 
aee that he holda that un ta not vhat he ia ( i . e . ,  ta not his 
neceaatty o r  hie already detetwined empirical actuality) and 
i a ,  in a a e ne e ,  what he ta not ( i . e . ,  ta hie potentialitiea or 
'hia poasibi l i t i es ) .  An individual ts construed as living 
t°"ards future, as yet unrealized, poasibi l i t i �  (or projects) 
.and being 110ti vated in hie behavior by vhat Kterke�aard ac­
curately described as a "subjective teleology . ·  The person 
e x t s t a ,  in a aense, at the ontoloaical intersection of factt­
city and possibility and ts not truly either, but a paradoxical 
ayntheaie of both. This, 1 believe, is what Sartre mean& in 
hia often cited for•ula for the nature of human reality. In 
this aenee, the aelf that ta in proceaa of becami� cannot be 
entirely determined because it ta vola t i l e ,  dyn88 1 c ,  or under­
going change . The eelf ta in the proceaa of creation, for 
better or worae, throu�hout a per1on•a Uf e t i tE .  It ta not 
analogous to a logically self-identical concept and i t  ta not a 
livtag "contrad i c t i o n . �  Ambivalent aomet imea, but eaaentially 
paradoxic a l .  In fact, aa Kierkegaard once aaid, if .. n were 
not p•rado�ical in hia being, then he could not change , could 
not atrive to realize poaaibili t i e a ,  could not, in a atrict 
aen.e, exist. Sartre •aya that i t  ta through aan that 
•nothingne a a ·  (•conaciouaneaa) enters the world; h e  •tght j u s t  
a a  we l l  have aatd that i n  human exiatence poaaibi lity enters 
the world. Kierkegaard , Heidegger, and Sartre a l l  acknowledge 
"objective poaaibil i t i e a "  i n  the world aa much aa the dedicated 
ampiriciat doea. However ,  given their philoeophical conce rna, 
they are lm:>re intereated in exaMining subjective possibi l ities. 
Contradiction in thought and being that Tol"fl'ey attributes 
to �artre'a oetensible conception of the "ambivalent aelt• are 
really paradoxical f eaturee of the dynamic nature of the s e l f  
t h a t  Sartre def e od a .  It doea not teke a genius to show ua that 
i nd i viduals are subject to conflicting eotivee, ambivalent 
7
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feelings,  and conflicting goals. But these subject ive states of 
being are not testimony to the ambivalent nature of the s e l f .  
Even in the mo a t  common choices we make w e  are, a s  Kierkegaard 
insightfully put i t ,  "in-between- possibility (a projected 
possibility of choice and action) and actuality (our empirical 
actuality up to and including the presen t ) .  An &•bivalent self 
such as Tormey depicts would suffer the paralysis and imm>bil­
ity that she aptly descTibes. But this ' s e l f '  is actually only 
a potential s el f ,  a character who is unable to resolve the pro­
blem of opposing possiblities of choice or action, who is inde­
cisive. This i s  virtually a portrait of the character ·A· i n  
Either/Or, a character who i s  compa red to a pawn surrounded on 
a chessboard that is unable -to a.>ve." Such a person is para­
digmatically living an inauthentic .ode of existence. 
Central t o  the existential ' therapy' of Sartre (and his 
predecessors) i s  the a t t empt to encourage them t o  become 
decisive in their lives, to liberate them for genuine choice. 
The appeal to von Wright 's notion that temporal processes are 
both .£.. and -£_ brings us back to an Hegelian conception of 
actuality. And t h i s ,  in turn, brings us back to Aristotle's 
idea that change requires a transition froai a potential state 
to an actual s t a t e .  This, of course, i s  where Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger, and Sartre enter the picture. But they prefer to 
point to the paradoxical tension& o f  human existence rather 
than using the logical model of what seems to be a kind of 
existential contradiction in the s e l f .  To be sure, there are 
opposing tendencies in the s e l f ,  even dialectical oppositions, 
but 1Q8n is not subject to a living, logical 'contradiction. ' 
The simple reason for t h i s ,  especially in Sartre's case, is 
that man is not interpreted i n  accordance with the 110del of 
logic. A person is never logically self-identified and never 
logically self-contrad i c t o i y .  I t  is S a r t r e 'a phenomenological 
ontology of human reality that determinee his rather complex 
analysis of the s e l f ,  self-deception, and ·bad f a i t h . "  Need­
less to say, i t  is decidedly .!!.2� a logo.orphic ontology. If i t  
is sometimes a psycho,logist ontology o f  human e:itistence, this 
is because Sartre believes, with good reason, that the psycho­
logical states o f ,  and psychological experiences o f ,  man are 
relevant to a full understanding of how tAan experiences him­
s e l f ,  others and the w o r l d .  H mf  we can talk about man and his 
experience without impinging on the deep psychological dimen­
sion of human life is d ifficult to understand. Ambivalence i s ,  
indeed , part o f  t h a t  experience; but i t  i s  not t h e  bssis o f  
Sartre's conception o f  the s e l f .  
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